The same foreign isolation from Afghan lives, which led us to fail, made it very difficult to acknowledge failure. Nowhere was this tendency clearer than with the military. Each new general in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011 suggested that the situation he had inherited was dismal, implied that this was because his predecessor had had the wrong resources or strategy, but asserted that he now had the resources, strategy and leadership to deliver a decisive year. In 2004, the new International Security Assistance Force commander, General Barno, said that “without question” 2004 would be a “decisive year”. General Abuzaid thought 2005 would be a “decisive year”, General Richards that 2006 would be the “crunch year” for the Taliban. Major General Champoux predicted that 2008 would be a “decisive year”. In 2009, General McChrystal stated: “The Taliban… no longer has the initiative… We are knee-deep in the decisive year.” Both the Nato secretary-general and the UK foreign secretary, David Miliband, predicted 2010 would be a “decisive year”. At the end of 2010, President Obama concluded: “For the first time in years, we’ve put in place the strategy and the resources.” German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle predicted that 2011 would be a “decisive year”.
Rory Stewart (He has a new book out that looks excellent)
(Source: Guardian)
Notes
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